In today's deep-dive, we look at how some Indian startup founders bought shares in their own companies at a fraction of the eventual IPO price. Peyush Bansal bought Lenskart shares at ₹52 before its ₹402 IPO, while an Amagi founder-controlled entity paid ₹25 for shares later offered at ₹361. Why did sophisticated investors sell so cheaply? Where did the money come from? And is this a clever way to build wealth or a risky bet? We examine the deals, numbers and little-known arrangements behind them.
On 10 November 2025, Peyush Bansal rang the opening bell at the National Stock Exchange. Lenskart, the eyewear company he had spent years building, was finally a listed business. For people who had bought shares in its IPO at ₹402 each, the morning was not especially cheerful. The stock opened at ₹395 on the NSE and ₹390 on the BSE. There were complaints about the valuation, arguments about whether the company deserved its price, and the usual excitement that follows a large startup listing. But the most remarkable number in Lenskart's IPO was not ₹402. It was ₹52, a price buried in the company's filings that told a very different story about who had been able to buy its shares a few months earlier.
Between 18 and 24 July that year, Bansal bought 4.27 crore Lenskart shares from a long list of existing investors at ₹52 apiece. The total bill came to about ₹222 crore. The sellers included investment vehicles associated with SoftBank, Kedaara, Temasek, Premji Invest, Alpha Wave and several other funds. These were not small investors who had lost track of the company's business. They were among the people who had helped finance Lenskart's growth. The filings list 37 transfer entries over that week, all at the same ₹52 price. Within roughly three months, Lenskart was asking public investors to pay ₹402 for the same class of ordinary share.
Do the arithmetic and the difference is difficult to ignore. At the IPO price, the shares Bansal bought for ₹222 crore had a market value of about ₹1,716 crore. That is an increase of roughly ₹1,494 crore before taxes, loan costs and other expenses. It is not money he necessarily put in his pocket. It is the value of an investment on paper, and selling restrictions matter. Yet even when the stock opened below its issue price at ₹390 on the BSE, those shares were worth about ₹1,665 crore. Someone buying at ₹402 had already lost money at the opening bell. Someone who had acquired shares at ₹52 was looking at a completely different calculation.
What makes it harder to explain is Lenskart's valuation history. In June 2024, Temasek and Fidelity bought into the company through a reported $200 million secondary transaction that valued it at about $5 billion. By July 2025, reports said Lenskart was aiming for a valuation close to $10 billion in its IPO. Yet the ₹52 purchase price was described as implying a company value near $1 billion. The eventual IPO did not reach the ambitious $10 billion target, but it still priced the shares at nearly eight times what Bansal had paid. It would be easier to understand if this were an unknown business, or if the sellers were unsophisticated. Neither was true.
The first obvious question is why Bansal wanted to buy. He had already watched his holding fall over years of fundraising, as happens to founders who keep selling portions of their companies to raise money. Moneycontrol reported that he was trying to strengthen his ownership and establish his position as a promoter before the IPO. His disclosed stake rose to 10.28%. Being identified as a promoter is not a prize automatically awarded to anyone crossing 10%, but having a stronger holding can matter for a founder who wants a lasting say in a company after institutional investors and public shareholders arrive. Other changes to Lenskart's share capital also affected his holding, so the July purchases cannot be treated as the whole explanation for that 10.28% figure.
That explains why he might want more shares. It does not explain why so many investors agreed to sell them for ₹52. A founder who has become central to a company's future may be worth keeping motivated. An old venture fund may also have investors waiting to get their money back. Selling even a small portion can help a fund return cash without giving up its entire investment. Some funds may have bought so early that ₹52 still represented a handsome gain on their original cost. These are sensible possibilities. But none of them should be presented as the answer until someone shows what the sellers originally paid, what agreements governed the sale and why that particular price was chosen.
There is another transaction that makes the question much more difficult. On 28 October 2025, shortly before Lenskart opened its IPO, cofounder Neha Bansal sold about 24.88 lakh shares to funds managed by SBI at ₹402 each, a transaction worth roughly ₹100 crore. The company's filing also records another October sale by Neha at ₹402. In July, multiple funds had sold shares to Peyush Bansal for ₹52. In October, another institutional buyer paid ₹402 to acquire shares from a cofounder. Same company, same face-value ordinary equity, and only a few months between the transactions. If the July price was perfectly reasonable, what changed so dramatically by October? If the October price was reasonable, why did the July sellers accept so much less?
There may be explanations buried in private agreements. Shareholders often have rights over who can buy their stock. Selling to a founder may help a company tidy up its ownership before listing. A transaction can contain assurances, restrictions or protections that never appear in a news headline. Perhaps the July sale was part of a wider arrangement that left investors better off than the ₹52 number suggests. Or perhaps the founders were simply offered terms that a new investor could not obtain. The public documents prove the prices and dates. They do not prove which explanation is right. But the fact that everyone agreed on exactly ₹52 makes the negotiations worth looking into.
The financing is another important part of the story. Before the transactions, Moneycontrol reported that Bansal was looking to borrow around ₹200 crore to fund the purchases. That is a large personal financial decision, even for someone with substantial wealth tied up in a valuable company. A founder can be rich on paper and short of spare cash. They may own shares worth hundreds of crores but still need a lender if they want to buy more. If an investor lends the money against existing shares or other security, a founder can increase ownership without first selling a large part of the holding built over the years. What has not been established publicly is who ultimately lent Bansal the money, exactly how much was drawn, the interest charged or whether the borrowing was later repaid.
The tempting version of this story is simple enough. Borrow ₹200 crore, buy shares at ₹52, wait for the IPO at ₹402, sell some and repay the loan. But there is a problem with that version. Under SEBI's IPO rules, ordinary shares offered for sale by existing shareholders generally need to have been held for at least one year before the draft prospectus was filed, with specified exceptions. Bansal's July purchases were made days before Lenskart filed its draft prospectus on 28 July. Those newly bought shares could not ordinarily be sold straight into the November IPO. Nor does a share becoming worth ₹402 mean its owner can immediately sell it at that price.
Bansal did sell shares in the IPO, but that is a different fact. He offered around 2.05 crore shares, worth approximately ₹824 crore at the issue price. A founder with older eligible shares could sell those while keeping a newer holding. In theory, the money from the older shares could be used for personal commitments, including debt. That does not establish that it happened here. The stock sold through the IPO and the stock bought in July should not be casually treated as one and the same. Until the funding and use of proceeds are documented, we know that Bansal bought a large block cheaply, later participated in an IPO sale, and ended up with a much bigger value attached to the shares purchased in July.
Now consider a similar trade at a company most Indian consumers have never used. Amagi, founded in Bengaluru, sells technology that helps television networks and streaming platforms run and distribute channels and advertisements. Its customers and revenue are spread across international markets, so it does not have Lenskart's consumer visibility. That did not stop global investors backing it. In 2022, General Atlantic invested in Amagi at a reported $1.4 billion valuation. By January 2026, when Amagi went public in India, its issue price of ₹361 implied a lower valuation, around $870 million. For some early investors, this was a listing at a valuation below the high prices paid in private funding rounds.
And yet a company linked to Amagi's own founders had bought shares at a price so low that the IPO still looked extraordinary. In July 2025, Vinculum Advisors LLP, a member of Amagi's promoter group, bought 35,08,930 shares for ₹25 each. The bill was about ₹8.77 crore. The shares came from eight investor entities including funds linked to Accel, Norwest and Premji Invest. The transfers took place between 22 and 24 July, around the time Amagi was preparing to file for its IPO. Six months later, the public price was ₹361. That meant the ₹8.77 crore holding was worth roughly ₹126.7 crore at the issue price. The difference was almost ₹118 crore, before allowing for expenses or restrictions.
Amagi had an even worse first morning on the stock exchanges than Lenskart. It opened at ₹317 on the BSE and ₹318 on the NSE on 21 January 2026, about 12% below the issue price. A retail investor who bought at ₹361 was immediately in the red. Vinculum's shares, however, were worth more than ₹111 crore even at the ₹317 opening price. The investor who paid the public price and the founder-group vehicle that paid ₹25 were exposed to the same company after listing, but they had entered at prices that gave them very different room for disappointment. One needed the stock to climb to get back to the starting point. The other had acquired its stake at less than one-fourteenth of the IPO price.
The Amagi filings contain an older transaction that makes its ₹25 price stranger still. In November 2022, founder and promoter-group shareholders sold ordinary shares to General Atlantic at ₹16,132.40 each. That was before Amagi issued 35 bonus shares for every share held in October 2024. Divide the 2022 price by 36 to compare it with the later share count and it becomes about ₹448 a share. So, at one point, an outside investor paid an effective ₹448 per share for founder holdings. In July 2025, a founder-group vehicle bought ordinary shares from investors at ₹25. In January 2026, the public paid ₹361. These were different circumstances, and valuation can certainly fall. But an eighteen-fold gap between the earlier adjusted price and the ₹25 purchase deserves a more serious explanation than the usual remark that private deals happen at discounts.
Amagi's prospectus adds an easily missed detail. The July purchases were governed by share-purchase agreements under which Vinculum and the founders made promises to the sellers, including protection against certain tax claims and proceedings. That means ₹25 might not tell us everything about what the sellers received or the risks they transferred. A seller willing to accept a lower price in return for specific legal protection may be making a different choice from one accepting ₹25 with no conditions. We do not have the complete agreements or a reliable explanation from all eight sellers. We know the deals happened. We know the headline return. We should not invent a motive for the people on the other side.
There is a later development that shows why the story should not stop at listing day. Amagi's September 2026 shareholding data still showed Vinculum holding the same 35,08,930 shares. The vehicle had not sold that entire July block into the IPO. Separately, a company disclosure confirmed that Vinculum had pledged 10 lakh shares during the financial year ending March 2026. An exchange filing in November 2026 records a further pledge of 10 lakh shares, taking the disclosed pledged holding to 20 lakh, with Avendus Finance named as the ultimate lender in the latest filing. That filing identifies the purpose as collateral for loans taken by the company or group companies. It does not say that these loans financed the original ₹25 purchase. Still, it shows that shares bought in one part of the IPO story can become security for borrowing in the next.
It is easy to see why people find these trades uncomfortable. A founder has a better view of the business than almost anyone outside it. They know how sales are progressing, what costs are troubling management, which investors want an exit, whether bankers have started work and what problems might delay a listing. A public investor reading a prospectus learns a great deal, but usually after many of these decisions have already been made. A venture fund is hardly ignorant, of course. It can have board representation, private accounts and years of direct contact with management. That is what makes the Lenskart and Amagi sellers interesting. They were knowledgeable counterparties. Why did the trades make sense to them?
The answer may lie partly in how venture funds make money. Imagine a fund that invested eight or ten years ago. Its investors want cash back, its managers need to show distributions, and there may be little appetite to wait another year for an IPO that could be postponed or priced badly. Selling a portion today may be worth more to that fund than holding out for a higher but uncertain price. Its remaining shares may still benefit if the company lists well. The founder, on the other hand, can look at the same bargain over a much longer period. They are not winding up a ten-year fund. They hope to run the company for another decade. Two parties can therefore agree on a price that looks irrational when compared with the IPO, while valuing the same shares differently for their own reasons.
The risk is real, however, and Zetwerk is a good way to see it. In 2025, cofounders Amrit Acharya and Srinath Ramakkrushnan arranged to put roughly ₹600 crore into the manufacturing company through a vehicle called Creovate Innovation. Reports said they raised personal debt for the investment, which increased their combined ownership by around two percentage points ahead of a planned listing. It was the sort of deal that can look clever when founders believe an IPO is approaching. Borrowing allows them to buy more ownership without first waiting for their existing shares to become cash. But debt has to be repaid whether the public market likes the business or not.
When Zetwerk finally listed in October 2026, its IPO was priced at ₹151. The prospectus gave Creovate's average acquisition cost, after converting its preference shares into ordinary stock, as ₹178.58 per share. Creovate sold about 2.30 crore shares in the IPO for roughly ₹347 crore. Applying its disclosed average cost to the shares sold gives an attributed cost of about ₹410 crore, some ₹63 crore more than the gross sale proceeds. That is not a final accounting loss after every financing and tax adjustment, but it is the opposite of the Lenskart arithmetic. A recently financed founder-group investment was being sold below its reported cost at the IPO itself. The shares opened above the issue price on 23 October but fell below it during the first trading day.
At the same time, Acharya and Ramakkrushnan each sold personal shares worth about ₹215 crore in the Zetwerk IPO. Those holdings had different acquisition histories from Creovate's recent investment. It would be wrong to lump the founders' personal receipts and the company's newer share purchase into one profit figure, or to assume their sale proceeds settled the loans raised in 2025. We need the loan terms, security documents and repayment trail to know that. This matters because a founder can make an impressive return on shares acquired years ago while a recent debt-funded purchase turns out badly. The two facts can sit in the same IPO prospectus.
InMobi suggests where the lending side of this business may be heading. The mobile advertising company arranged a reported $350 million financing package in 2025 from lenders including Värde Partners, Elham Credit Partners and SeaTown, linked to buying out some existing investors. Reporting described a $200 million facility at the operating-company level and a $150 million facility at the holding-company level, with security connected to founder holdings. This is not a documented example of someone buying at ₹25 and selling at ₹361. There is no completed InMobi IPO in these facts. But it shows how lenders can become part of the negotiations over who owns a company before its shares begin trading publicly. The person making the purchase may be a founder, a family vehicle or a holding company, and the borrower may be someone else entirely.
Other IPO filings show different ways founders have managed their ownership. Before Urban Company's listing, its founders sold shares worth around ₹780 crore across secondary transactions, and reportedly used some of the proceeds to complete payments for shares issued to them years earlier. At Meesho, the company paid about ₹734 crore in tax arising from its founders exercising stock options. At Ather Energy, historical founder shares carried a very low average purchase cost compared with the IPO price. None of those is the same as investors selling shares to founders at a deep discount. They are reminders that a founder's shareholding can be changed through loans, employee options, rights issues, old holdings and straightforward sales. Putting all those transactions in one basket would make the apparent pattern bigger than the evidence supports.
There are also rules that make the simple buy-cheap-sell-expensive story less simple. SEBI places conditions on how recently acquired shares can be used in an IPO, including which shares can count towards promoters' required contribution and when certain holdings can be sold. A promoter buying shares below the IPO price during the preceding year may be unable to count them towards the minimum contribution unless an exception applies. Lock-in rules can stop immediate sales. Tax law can create consequences when unlisted shares are transferred below a prescribed fair market value, although the fair value used for tax is not automatically the later IPO price. None of these rules means a low-priced purchase is automatically illegal. Nor does a disclosed deal prove every aspect of its price was fair.
What bothers me most about the two dramatic examples is not that founders can buy more of the businesses they built. In many companies, founders have become minority owners after years of raising money. There is a good argument for letting them recover some ownership before going public, especially when they remain responsible for running the business. Nor can a public investor claim they were forced to subscribe at ₹402 or ₹361. Anyone who thought the IPO price was absurd could stay away. The question is why the best-informed person in the company was able to purchase at a price that seemingly bore so little relation to the prices other knowledgeable buyers had paid before and after.
The investors arriving at the IPO are usually asked to judge the future of the business. They debate growth, margins and whether the founders deserve a rich valuation. That debate is worth having, but it starts very late. The ownership decisions that matter most to founders and early investors may already have been settled months before the first public bid is placed. At Lenskart, public buyers argued over whether ₹402 was too expensive on listing day. Inside the company, the shares bought for ₹52 had already turned into an investment worth many times the purchase price. The story of those shares began long before the bell rang.


